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This article analyzes the impact of outlaw innovations on the video game market. 
Rather than solely focusing on piracy in a closed economy, this study discusses the 
impact of parallel imports (PI) inspired by outlaw innovations. A simple model with 
one monopolistic hardware manufacturer and one monopolistic software provider 
selling complementary products in two countries is developed to show three results 
that are in contrast to general expectation. First, software piracy could be beneficial 
for both firms. Second, the hardware manufacturer may benefit from PI. Third, 
consumers in the PI recipient country are not necessarily better off due to PI. 
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Outlaw Innovation, Software Piracy and Parallel Imports in the 
Video Game Market 
 
1. Introduction 
Innovations not only can be done by manufacturers but also be realized by users. User 
innovations aim to add more functions that are not originally provided on the product 
or to bypass legal or technical safeguards. In particular, electronic manufactures often 
embed security mechanism in order to prevent users from running unauthorized 
software or illegally obtained content on their platform. For example, the region code 
on a DVD player prevents users from buying parallel imported multimedia products. 
The security mechanism on a game console prevents illegally copied game ROMs 
from being operated on the platform. Similar examples can also be found in 
telecommunication industry. Before 2011, Apple’s iPhone users could only choose 
AT&T in United States because of the mechanism that aims to increase firms’ market 
power. Mollick (2004) is the first study that analyzes user innovations that deactivate 
the security mechanisms. Extending Mollick’s research, Flowers (2008) introduces 
the concept of outlaw innovation and provides case studies of how communities 
create and distribute outlaw innovations. As defined by Schulz and Wagner (2008), 
outlaw innovations are user modifications of a product to not only gain unauthorized 
access to the product’s system but to also enable the user to use the system more 
effectively. Outlaw innovation is an important issue because it may violate 
manufacturers’ intellectual property rights (IPRs) and will restrict manufacturers’ 
market power as well as pricing behaviors. For example, users of a video game 
console can embed a modification chip (or modchip), which is a device used to run 
import discs, backup dvd-r/ dvd-rw, or homebrew game ROMs on the game console, 
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to play pirated video games.  
This article is motivated by the fact that Sony has decided to make its new 
generation game console, Playstation 3 (PS3), a region-free game console.1 In other 
words, PS3 users can play international version games on the PS3 platform if the 
hardware is region-free. A PS3 player can run a USA version game on the Japanese 
hardware and vice versa. As we know, the modification chips encourage video game 
piracy and parallel imports (PI). When video game piracy is mentioned, it is widely 
expected that the modification chips will boost sales of game consoles and will reduce 
the game providers’ profit. However, in this study, it is shown that the latter is not 
necessarily true.  
In addition to illegal copy of the software, the modification chips can also 
undermine manufacturers’ international third degree price discrimination by inspiring 
parallel trade. However, the present model shows that it is premature to claim that the 
hardware manufacturer will suffer from parallel imports. Why is parallel importation 
beneficial for the IPR holder? Several models have different explanations. In the 
literature of PI, studies can be roughly categorized as vertical price control model and 
horizontal retail price arbitrage model. The vertical price control model of PI, which is 
first developed by Maskus and Chen (2002, 2004) and Chen and Maskus (2005), 
assumes that a manufacturer protected by IPR in two markets has an independent 
distributor in each location. The manufacturer offers the distributors two-part tariff 
contracts that specify the wholesale prices and a lump-sum fee in order to induce 
profit-maximizing retail prices. In the framework of vertical price control model, 
Ganslandt and Maskus (2007) develop a model to show that the manufacturer will 
prefer to serve a country by PI when trade cost is sufficiently low. The idea behind 
their result is that the manufacturer would push the distributor in the PI recipient 
                                                 
1 See “regional lockout” on Wikipedia:  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Regional_lockout 
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country out of the market in order to avoid pro-competitive effect when trade cost is 
small.  
The other framework, horizontal retail price arbitrage model, assumes that PI 
occurs simply due to retail price differences between two markets. (Ahmadi & Yang, 
2000; Malueg & Schwartz, 1994) In general, retail price arbitrage prevents the 
manufacturer from third-degree price discrimination; however, Anderson and 
Ginsburg (1999) argue that consumers’ arbitrage behaviors provide the manufacturer a 
channel to second-degree price discrimination. They develop a two-country model 
with heterogeneous consumers to show that a firm with market power may have an 
incentive to create a second market in the second country, even though there is no 
local demand there. The intuition is that consumer’s arbitrage between two countries 
provides the firm a means to price discriminate across consumers in the first country.  
The analysis of the present article adopts horizontal retail price arbitrage model 
and follows the idea of Anderson and Ginsburg (1999). A consumer who purchases a 
game console from unauthorized channels has a strong tendency to play pirated or 
illegally obtained games.2 This kind of consumer has lower willingness to pay and 
thus parallel imports give the manufacturer a lead to distinguish high-type consumers 
and low-type consumers; hence second-degree price discrimination in the PI recipient 
country becomes feasible.  
The idea that parallel imports or pirated goods lead to second degree price 
discrimination is not new. Takeyama (1994) develops a model to discuss the impact of 
software piracy on software providers in the presence of network externalities. She 
finds that with network externality, piracy is an efficient means to expand network 
size and thus the copies are sold at one price (zero) while genuine product buyers are 
                                                 
2 One report on 2007.04.30 indicates that more than 80% Taiwanese consumers who purchased 
parallel imported Wii game consoles asked to modify the hardware to play pirated games. See The Sun, 
Hong Kong. 
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charged at a higher price. However, her model can’t be applied to video game piracy 
because her model does not take the hardware firm into account. Taking the hardware 
firm into consideration is pivotal for discussing piracy in the video game market 
because the video game console is generally a closed platform, which means the 
hardware is specific for the software. In other words, both hardware and software 
firms’ pricing behaviors will be pinned down by each other given the fact that their 
products are perfect complements. Thus, the interaction between the hardware firm 
and the software firm deserves scrutiny. In addition, most articles that discuss 
software piracy solely consider the story in a closed economy. In other words, they 
ignore the impact of PI on the hardware manufacturer and the software provider. To 
have a better understanding of the effect of software piracy in an open video game 
market, one contribution of the present article is to discuss the nexus between 
software piracy and parallel imports in the video game market. 
Another reason to buttress that video game market is worthy of study is as 
follows. As pointed out by Fink and Maskus (2005), the welfare consequences of an 
IPR exhaustion policy differ across industries. Welfare analysis of PI for a particular 
industry might be inapplicable to another one. To my knowledge, PI-related articles 
solely discuss the interaction between the monopolist (the IPR holder) and 
downstream distributors. They do not consider the case that the product sold by the 
IPR holder may need another component to work. Therefore, welfare implications in 
those studies may not hold in the video game market. The present article differs from 
those PI studies in the aspect that this study is the first one that provides welfare 
analysis of PI in complementary goods. It sheds some lights on pricing by software 
and hardware firms when they feature complementary products and the hardware can 
be parallel traded while the other not. This article argues that parallel trade in 
hardware is a channel used to let consumers reveal their preference for playing video 
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games. Authorized hardware and PI are homogeneous to pirated software users (low 
type consumers) because after-sale service is not available for modified-hardware 
users. Therefore, the manufacturer can extract more profits from consumers by 
serving high type consumers by authorized products with a higher price and serving 
low type consumers by cheaper PI. Based on this idea, in this article, we develop a 
simple model with one monopolistic hardware manufacturer and one monopolistic 
software provider (where the hardware and the software are perfect complements) 
selling their products in two countries. Starting from the assumption that the hardware 
is protected by a region code which prevents consumers from using international 
version software, we show three results that are in contrast to general expectation. 
First, the software provider and the hardware manufacturer could both benefit from 
software piracy. Second, the hardware manufacturer may benefit from PI because PI 
can either become a commit device to raise the hardware price in the PI exporting 
country or serve as a channel to second-degree price discrimination in the PI recipient 
country. Third, the consumers in the PI recipient country are not necessarily better off 
due to PI because the gains from an open policy might be offset if the hardware firm 
chooses to engage in price discrimination. Then to explain why Sony made its new 
generation game consoles region-free, we relax the region code assumption and show 
that, in equilibrium, imposing a region code on the hardware is redundant. All results 
in this study still hold for region-free hardware. 
This article is organized as follows. A simple model is developed in section 2. 
Welfare analysis is given in section 3. Section 4 offers a short analysis of a region-free 
hardware and section 5 concludes. 
2. The Model 
In this section, we develop the basic non-cooperative game with a monopolistic 
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hardware manufacturer and one software provider.3 We will discuss two cases. First, 
let’s consider the impact of software piracy on the hardware manufacturer and the 
software provider respectively when parallel importation is not permitted. Second, we 
will discuss the impact of PI on both firms given software piracy. 
There are two countries, A and B. We assume that the total number of consumers 
in either country is normalized to unity. Consumers are heterogeneous in their value 
of playing video games. Let v denote a consumer’s gross utility of playing video 
games. The distribution of v in both countries is identical and is assumed to be a 
uniform distribution with support [0,1]. Here, the hardware is assumed to provide zero 
utility if it is not utilized with software.  
 
2.1  The Benchmark: The Basic Model with No Piracy 
Let’s consider the benchmark case: no piracy, no PI. The utility functions in both 
countries are given by 
 
   if purchasing the system
;  ,
0                         if no adoption
i i
i oBM hBMv p pU i A B
   
 (1) 
i
oBMp  denotes the price of official software in country i and
i
hBMp is the price of 
hardware in country i. The subscript BM indicates the variable for the benchmark 
case. 
Without loss of generality, we take country A as the discussing object. A 
consumer in country A with v A AoBM hBMv p p    will purchase the system. For 
simplicity, we also assume that both hardware and software firms’ marginal cost are 
normalized to zero.4 Because each consumer purchases one unit of the product, the 
                                                 
3 The assumption of non-cooperative game is briefly discussed in section 5. 
4 This seems a stronger assumption on manufacturer’s marginal cost. Normalizing the marginal cost to 
zero helps simplify the analysis. Nevertheless, this simplification is acceptable for two firms producing 
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quantity demanded can be calculated by 
1
v
1d x 1 A AoBM hBMp p   . Now we can obtain 
both firms’ profit earned in country A: 
  1   ;  ,A A A AjBM jBM oBM hBMp p p j h o      (2) 
The optimization of (2) with respect to AoBMp  and 
A
hBMp indicates that 
* * 1
3
A A
oBM hBMp p   
Identical argument can be applied to country B and we will have  
* * 1
3
B B
oBM hBMp p    
Therefore, both firms’ profits in this benchmark case are identical and equal to the 
sum of profits in both countries given by 2
9
. 
 
2.2 Software Piracy When PI is Prohibited 
In this section, we consider the case where pirated software is available in country 
A. For simplicity, we assume that consumers in country B are unable to access pirated 
software. The consumer’s utility function in country A now becomes 
  
           if purchasing legitimate software
1 if using illegal software 
0                                  if no adoption
A A
hPN oPN
A A
hPN
v p p
U v p c 
      
 (3) 
The subscript PN indicates that piracy exists while parallel imports do not. 
 1   is a discount factor to the value v if the consumer modifies the hardware. 
                                                                                                                                            
perfect complements. To see this, following the benchmark setup, supposed that the hardware firm 
bears a positive marginal cost m , it is easy to check the marginal cost of one firm has equal impact on 
both firms by verifying that the profit of both the hardware and the software firm equals   21 3m . 
Therefore, even though the value of the marginal cost does affect values of the variables, such as the 
profit level, it will not affect the direction of the change in variables due to some scenarios 
demonstrated in our model. The main interest of this chapter is to discuss how firms’ profits and 
consumer’s welfare change and thus it is acceptable to normalize the marginal cost to zero. 
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Assume that by installing the modification chip on the hardware, users can bypass all 
security mechanism including region code. Here,  0,1   to capture the fact that 
any unauthorized modification to the hardware will void warranty. The parameter   
can also be interpreted as the probability that a hardware buyer needs after sale 
service. 5  0c   refers to a fixed cost of modifying the hardware. 6   0,1   
measures the extra benefit along with the hardware modification. For example, more 
powerful multimedia functions on a modified Microsoft XBOX.7 
We assume that both firms set price simultaneously. Both firms can either act to 
accommodate or to deter piracy.8 To accommodate piracy, both firms will act by 
assuming that piracy exists in equilibrium. On the other hand, to deter piracy, firms 
will charge a price as if piracy were not available. There are 4 possible strategy 
combinations in this game. Let’s check the payoff of each strategy: 
2.2.1 Both firms accommodate piracy  
Let 1v  be the value of one consumer who is indifferent between using official 
software and pirated copy. Therefore,  1 1v 1 vA A AoPN hPN hPNp p p c        . A 
consumer will purchase official software if his valuation  1v
A
oPNp cv


   . 
Thus, the quantity demanded for legitimate software is  
1
1
v
1dx 1
A
oPNp c 

   . It 
is worthy to note that the quantity demanded for the official software is irrelevant to 
the hardware price because the hardware price does not play a role in consumer’s 
                                                 
5 Some studies such as Takeyama (1994) and Bae and Choi (2006) consider  1  as a utility 
discount factor for using pirated software. However, as stated in Peitz and Waelbroeck (2006), for 
video game piracy, the original and the copy have almost the same quality. Therefore, in this study, we 
will use  1   to represent the utility discount factor due to loss of after-sale service. 
6 For example, a modification chip or a recordable DVD that is required to make and play a homebrew 
pirated Wii game. 
7 For more detail discussions on XBOX modification, see Schulz and Wagner (2008). 
8 For example, even when piracy is available, the hardware firm still can charge AhPNp such that 
 0 1A A AhPN oPN hPNv p p v p c          to deter piracy. 
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choice between legitimate software and pirated software. 
The software provider maximizes his profit in country A: 
 max 1
A
A AoPN
oPN oPNApoPN
p c p 
     
 (4) 
The optimization problem indicates that the optimal official software price in country 
A is   * 0,1
2
A
oPN
cp      
Both official software buyers and pirated software users need to purchase the 
hardware. Let 2v  be the value of a consumer who is indifferent between using the 
system and no adoption. Therefore, consumers with 2v 1
A
hPNp cv 
     will buy 
the hardware. The hardware manufacturer maximizes its profit in country A: 
 max 1
1AhPN
A
A AhPN
hPN hPN
p
p c p 
     
 (5) 
Solving (5) to find the optimal hardware price in country A, we will have 
* 1 0
2
A
hPN
cp      . It is natural to assume that 1v  is greater than 2v . Because 
 0,1  , this inequality implies that c  .9 
 In short, the payoff of the hardware firm and the software firm can be easily 
calculated and are equal to   
2
* 1
4 1
A
hPN
c  
     and 
 2*
4
A
oPN
c  
   
respectively. 
2.2.2 The hardware firm deters piracy while the software firm does not 
 In this case, the software firm sets price in the same way as what was described 
in section 2.2.1. i.e. 
2
A
oPN
cp      . However, the hardware firm sets a price to 
deter piracy. In this case, the quantity demanded for the hardware equals 
                                                 
9 The derivation of this inequality is demonstrated in the appendix A1. 
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1A A AhPN hPN oPNq p p   . By setting optimal price  1 12A AhPN oPNp p    and substituting  
2
A
oPN
cp      into the profit function, it is easy to show that the hardware firm’s 
profit in this case can be denoted by 
2(2 )
16
A
hPN
c      . Similarly, the profit of 
the software firm equals (2 )( )(1 )
8
A A A A
oPN oPN hPN oPN
c cp p p                . 
Obviously, this case is not a Nash equilibrium. When piracy is deterred by the 
hardware firm, the software firm will deviate by setting (1 ) / 2A AoPN hPNp p   to 
maximize profits as described in section 2.1, the benchmark case. 
 
2.2.3 The hardware firm accommodates piracy while the software firm does not 
 According to section 2.2.1, if the hardware firm accommodates piracy, he will 
charge 1
2
A
hPN
cp       . Suppose that the software firm acts as if piracy were 
not available, then the software firm will set 1 (1 )
2
A A
oPN hPNp p   . Therefore, the 
profit of the hardware firm equals 
2(1 )
4(1 )
A
hPN
c  
      and the profit of the 
software firm becomes ( 1 3( ))(1 )
16
A
oPN
c c    
        . 
 
2.2.4 Both firms deter piracy 
 This case is identical to the benchmark case (section 2.1). The payoff in country 
A will be (1/9,1/9). 
 Table 1 summarizes the payoff of two firms.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 Supposed that hardware firm chooses {Accommodate Piracy}, because 
 2( 1 3( ))(1 )
16 4
cc c     
 
          , {Deter Piracy} is a dominated 
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strategy for the software firm. Therefore, (Accommodate Piracy, Accommodate 
Piracy) constitutes a Nash equilibrium if   
2 21 (2 )
4 1 16
c c   

      . 
Simplifying the inequality yields  21 2 2 13c           . Otherwise, 
both firms to deter piracy (i.e. both firms set price equal to 1/3) is the Nash 
equilibrium. We summarize this finding in proposition 1. 
 
Proposition 1. When piracy is available, the Nash equilibrium is 
 
   
21 1,  if 2 2 1 0
2 2 3
,
1 1,            otherwise
3 3
A A
hPN oPN
c c c
p p
        
                     
 
 Proposition 1 claims that if  21 2 2 1 03c             is 
violated, then piracy won’t exist in equilibrium, even though people have access to 
pirated software. Therefore, to make our further analysis nontrivial, let’s assume 
 21 2 2 1 03c            . More findings are provided in 
proposition 2 and proposition 3. 
 
Proposition 2. The hardware manufacturer can sell more units when software piracy 
exists in equilibrium. 
 
<Proof> If piracy is not available, the value v such that one consumer is indifferent 
between buying the system and no adoption is equal to 2 3 . In other words, total 
quantity sold by the hardware manufacturer is 1 3 of the total population. However, 
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when software piracy is introduced, total hardware quantity sold is 
2
1
1 121 v 1 1
1 2 1 3
c c c
   
 
                   
 for 0c   . Q.E.D 
The profits that both firms can obtain in country B are identical to the benchmark 
case discussed in section 2.1. Total profits of the software provider can be calculated 
by substituting *AoPNp  into 
A
oPN  and then plus the profit from country B. Let oPN  
denote the profit of the software provider under the situation where software piracy 
exists while PI do not. We have  2* 1
9 4oPN
c  
   . The combined profit 
function of the hardware manufacturer becomes10 
   
2
*
1 2
11 for 1 v v 0
9 4 1hPN
c  
        (6) 
Now we can compare the profits obtained in this section to those calculated in the 
benchmark case to see the impact of software piracy on the hardware manufacturer 
and the software provider. The hardware manufacturer can (weakly) benefit from 
software piracy if * * 2 9hPN hBM   . Solving this inequality along with 
 21 2 2 1 03c            , we have 
 
 
  
 
  
2
2
1 21 12   if  0<
3 23
1 21 1 32 1   if  
3 2 43
2 1 3 3 81   if  
3 4 9
c
c
c
    
    
    
                           
 (7) 
                                                 
10 It is easy to verify that 1 21 v v 0   . Any other situations do not hold. When 2v 0 , the market 
is fully served by the hardware manufacturer. However, 2v  will never be strictly less than zero 
because the hardware manufacturer has an incentive to increase the hardware price. 
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Similarly, the software provider can earn a higher profit if * * 2 9oPN oBM   . This 
inequality is tedious and thus the reduced form won’t be provided. Let’s look at the 
finding graphically in figure 1. The combination of  , c   where the hardware 
manufacturer (software provider) can benefit from piracy is depicted by the light 
(dark) area in figure 1. The medium dark area is the intersection of dark area and light 
area, which indicates the combination of  , c    where both hardware 
manufacturer and software provider benefit from software piracy.  
 
Proposition 3. Software piracy is not always beneficial (harmful) for hardware 
(software) firm. In addition, there exist several combinations of   and c   such 
that both hardware and software firms can benefit from piracy. i.e. the medium dark 
area in figure 1.  
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
The colored area indicates the parameter set such that piracy exists in equilibrium. 
Two interesting findings are present in proposition 3. The first one is that for certain 
parameter sets, the software firm can even benefit from piracy. To see this, let’s go 
back to the derivation of quantity demanded for the legitimate software. In the 
benchmark case, where no piracy exists, the marginal consumer compares the surplus 
between buying the system and no adoption. Both hardware price and software price 
affect his/her choice. The inverse demand function for software in the benchmark case 
is 1oBM oBM hBMp q p   , which is a linear inverse demand with slope -1 and 
intercept  1 hBMp . However, in a model with piracy, hardware price won’t affect 
the choice of the marginal consumer who considers whether to buy the legitimate 
software or to pirate the software. The inverse demand function for the software in the 
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case with piracy is    1oPN oPNp q c     , which is a linear inverse demand 
with slope   and intercept   c   . The parameter   can measure how 
elastic the software demand is. Because 1  , the inverse demand function for the 
software in the case with piracy is flatter than the benchmark. However, the inverse 
demand function is also controlled by the intercept. With a sufficiently small number 
of  c  , i.e.  c   is sufficiently closed to zero, such that  c   is smaller 
than hBMp , the software provider in fact faces a larger market in the case with piracy 
than in the benchmark case as long as   is not too small. In other words, comparing 
the result in this section to the benchmark case, if the “disadvantage” due to elasticity 
( ) can be covered by the gain from consumer’s willingness to pay (larger intercept 
captured by small  c  ), the software firm can benefit from piracy.  
The second interesting finding is that it is possible for the hardware firm to suffer 
from piracy. This result seems surprising; however, it becomes clear when we check 
the payoff matrix. The dark area in figure 1 implies that for  and c   in this area, 
we have 
2 2(2 ) (1 ) 1
16 4(1 ) 9
c c   

       . This means that the payoff matrix 
(table 1) constitutes a coordination game. Hence, we can’t rule out the possibility that 
the hardware firm may suffer from piracy. 
 
2.3  Software Piracy When PI is Considered 
In this section, let’s consider the case such that consumers in country A can choose 
to buy the hardware from either country A or country B. The hardware purchased 
from country B is called a parallel import. We can imagine that there are many traders 
who purchase the hardware from retail markets in country B and sell the product in 
country A. Eventually, PI traders earn zero profit with free entry assumption. However, 
16 
 
if a consumer purchases a PI hardware, some modifications to the hardware are 
required to bypass the region code safeguard. In addition, because the regulation on 
multimedia product is stronger in reality, we assume that the parallel importation of 
software is prohibited between two countries.11 Because we assume that the hardware 
is protected by a region code, it will be one-way PI from country B to country A for 
the reason that the modification chip is not available in country B. Given our model 
specification, we would claim that all PI hardware buyers will pirate the software. The 
reason is straightforward because if a consumer purchases PI hardware but buys 
official software, his utility is  1 B Ah ov p c t p       , which is strictly smaller 
than  1 Bhv p c t      , the utility obtained by pirating software. Here, a 
nonnegative parameter t  represents the international shipping cost.12 
The hardware manufacturer has two options to serve country A. The first option is 
to serve all consumers in country A only by authorized products and charging a single 
price Ahp . The other option is to fulfill the demand in country A by both authorized 
products and parallel imports simultaneously. In the later case, there will be two 
different prices, the price of the authorized hardware ( Ahp ) and the price of PI 
( Bhp t ). Let’s discuss both cases in section 2.3.1 and section 2.3.2. 
 
2.3.1 Regime DP: The hardware manufacturer serves country A by authorized 
products only ( setting A Bh hp p t   to deter PI): 
Because we assume that the hardware is protected by a region code, in this case, it 
                                                 
11 For example, parallel imports of copyrighted works are considered to be a copyright infringement. 
See Article 87(4) , Taiwan Copyright Law.  
12 We do not assume search cost on PI because we assume there are many PI traders in the economy. 
This is particularly true for small open economies such as Taiwan and Hong Kong, where PI are very 
common and popular. Thus, we assume the extra search cost for PI is insignificant and can be ignored. 
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will be one-way PI from B to A given the assumption that the modification chip is not 
available in country B. The manufacturer will maximize his profit by solving the 
following optimization problem:13 
 
   
 
,
2
max 1 1
1
. .        
1       2 2 1 0
3
1 1       
2 3
A B
h h
A
A B B BhDP
hDP hDP hDP hDP oDP
p p
A B
hDP hDP
p cp p p p
s t p p t
c
c t
 
    
 
        
 
       
    
 (8) 
In other words, the hardware firm maximizes profits by setting two prices in two 
countries to prevent consumers from buying the hardware from unauthorized 
channels. 
The software provider’s profit maximization problem is 
    ,max 1 1A Bo o
A
A B B BoDP
oDP oDP oDP hDP oDP
p p
p cp p p p 
        
 (9) 
Solving the optimization problem of both firms simultaneously, we have 
 
   
   
*
*
*
*
2
3 1 2 4
7 3
3 1 2 4
7 3
2 2
7 3
A
oDP
A
hDP
B
hDP
B
oDP
cp
c t
p t
c t
p
c tp
 
 

 



 
    
    
   
 
It is premature to claim that the hardware manufacturer will suffer from DP. By 
drawing a 3D graph on the space of  , t  and c  , we can verify that the 
hardware manufacturer will benefit from DP. Figure 2 (figure 3) shows the region 
where the hardware manufacturer benefits (suffers) from DP. We get an empty set in 
                                                 
13 If 
1 1
2 3
c t      , PI in this regime won’t occur and the result is identical to section 2.2.1. 
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figure 3 suggesting that the profit of the hardware manufacturer will increase if the 
hardware manufacturer sets the prices to deter PI. 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
The reason for the hardware manufacturer to benefit from an open policy on 
parallel importation even when he chooses to deter PI is that when parallel 
importation is allowed, parallel imports in this scenario make the prices of hardware 
in two countries convergent. The software provider will respond to the increase14 of 
B
hp  by cutting the price of the software in country B. Because the hardware and the 
software are complements, parallel trade is a commitment device for the hardware 
manufacturer to raise the hardware price in country B and thus parallel trade enables 
the hardware firm to extract profits from the software provider. In short, even though 
the hardware firm suffers in the PI recipient country by deterring PI, the 
complementarity between the hardware and the software enables the hardware firm to 
benefit in the parallel exporting country. As consequence, the benefit in country B 
dominates the loss in country A. 
The software provider’s profit in country A will not change. However, given our 
parameter restriction, 1 1
2 3
c t      , the software provider’s profit will 
decrease in country B because both price and quantity demanded for the software in 
country B decrease.15  
 
                                                 
14 It is easy to check that 
   * 3 1 2 4 1
7 3 3
B
hDP
c t
p
 

      given
1 1
2 3
c
t
      . 
15 * *B BhDP oDPp p  is greater than 
2
3
 (the value in the benchmark case) and *
2 2 1
7 3 3
B
oDP
c t
p


      
(the price charged by the software firm in the benchmark case) provided that 
1 1
2 3
c
t
      . 
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2.3.2 Regime AP: The hardware manufacturer serves country A by both 
authorized products and PI (Accommodate PI): 
If 1 1
2 3
c     , DP won’t occur. However, parallel importation is still 
possible in another scenario which is the one we will discuss in this section. The 
hardware manufacturer can utilize parallel imports as a channel to price 
discrimination. Because illegal software users have to modify the hardware, after-sale 
service is not available even if they purchase the hardware from authorized channels. 
The only concern that illegal software users have in mind in choosing where to buy 
the hardware is the price of the hardware. If authorized hardware is cheaper than PI, 
no consumers will purchase PI, which is either an uninteresting case or has been 
discussed in section 2.3.1. Therefore, in this section, we will consider the case where 
the hardware price in country A is higher than the price of PI, which is the hardware 
price in country B plus international shipping cost. The price gap sustains even when 
parallel importation exists because PI is now a channel to separating different types of 
consumers. In our specification, all illegal software users will buy PI and only those 
consumers who purchase official software will buy the authorized hardware. 
Consumer’s preference in country A and country B can be described by 
 
 
                      if purchasing the legitimate system
1    if using pirated software and PI
0                                      if no adoption
            
A A
h o
A B
h
B B
B h o
v p p
U v p t c
v p p
U
 
       
            if purchasing the system
0                                      if no adoption

 
 
We can now obtain the profit functions of both hardware and software firms. The 
hardware manufacturer’s profit maximization problem is  
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
 
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  
           
        
         
 21     2 2 1 03
A B
hAPp t
c    
 
       
 (10) 
The derivation of (10) is shown in appendix A2. The first term in the profit function is 
the profit obtained in country B where piracy is absent. The second term describes the 
profit from PI and the last term in the profit function is the profit from selling 
authorized hardware in country A. 
1
A A B B
oAP hAP hAP hAPp p p t c p t c 
 
          
  
represents the PI volume while 1
A A B
oAP hAP hAPp p p t c 

       
 describes the 
quantity demanded for the authorized hardware in country A. The inequality 
A B
hAP hAPp p t   comes from the assumption that the hardware manufacturer serves 
country A by both authorized products and parallel imports. If it were violated, the 
result will be identical to regime DP. 
Similarly, the software provider maximizes his profit 
  1 1 A A BB B B A oAP hAP hAPoAP oAP oAP hAP oAP p p p t cp p p p               (11) 
The solution to the optimization problem (10) and (11) is  
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subject to16 
      
7 6 5 1
0 min ,
2 7 6 5
c cct
     
 
              
 
Comparing this set of prices to that in the case of DP, given the constraints on t, we 
have the following results: * *A AhAP hDPp p , * *B BhAP hDPp p , * *A AoAP oDPp p , and 
* *B B
oAP oDPp p . In other words, the hardware firm charges higher prices whereas the 
software provider reduces the prices in both countries if the hardware manufacturer 
chooses AP. The reason for an increase in hardware price in country B builds on an 
increase in demand for country B’s hardware since consumers who pirate the software 
will purchase the hardware from country B. One should note that the extra demand for 
hardware from country B does not accompany with an increase in the demand for 
country B’s official software. Actually, the increase in demand for country B’s 
hardware could be harmful for the software provider in country B. Since PI may raise 
the price of country B’s hardware, fewer consumers in country B are willing to 
purchase the system (hardware plus software) and thus the demand for the software in 
country B decreases. Therefore, the price of software in country B falls. It is not 
surprising to see that the price of authorized hardware in country A increases. But now, 
                                                 
16 
2
c
t
    because A Bh hp p t   ;      
7 6 5 1
7 6 5
c c
t
    
 
           because 
1 2v v
AP AP . 
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the software price in country A is affected by the price of hardware because by 
checking (10), we can see that the marginal consumer is considering the price gap 
between the authorized hardware and PI. The same argument in the analysis of a 
decrease in software price can be applied to country A, which is an increase in the 
hardware price leads to a decrease in software price.  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
Table 2 summarizes the strategies that the hardware firm can adopt in different 
situations. When * *A BhPN hPNp p t   (i.e.1 12 3
c t      ), autarky equilibrium is 
not sustainable, and thus the hardware firm can choose between DP and AP. Whether 
AP dominates DP or not depends on the values of parameters. Figure 4 shows the 
region where AP is the hardware firm’s profit-maximizing pricing behavior for 
* *A B
hPN hPNp p t  . On the other hand, when * *A BhPN hPNp p t  , the hardware firm can 
choose either AP or autarky pricing. The region where AP dominates autarky pricing 
is presented in figure 5. The reason why the hardware firm can benefit from AP is that 
the hardware firm can utilize PI as a channel to distinguishing two types of consumers 
and obtain higher profits. Price discrimination is possible because illegal software 
users do not care about after-sale service and thus are more sensitive to hardware 
price. Cheaper PI help the hardware firm identify two types of consumers. Let’s 
summarize the conditions such that each strategy to be adopted by the hardware firm 
by the tree map in figure 6.  
[Insert Figure 4 here] 
[Insert Figure 5 here] 
[Insert Figure 6 here] 
Proposition 4. Parallel imports are never harmful to the hardware manufacturer.  
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When * *A BhPN hPNp p t  , PI is always beneficial for the hardware firm because in 
section 2.3.1, we have shown that the hardware firm can always raise the profit by DP. 
Figure 4 also shows that AP can even dominate DP for certain parameters. On the 
other hand, when * *A BhPN hPNp p t  , in certain circumstances which are demonstrated 
in figure 5, AP is more desirable than autarky pricing. In sum, the hardware firm can 
adopt a proper strategy such that his profit is guaranteed to be greater or equal to 
autarky.  
We can then discuss the impact of hardware manufacturer’s second degree price 
discrimination behavior on the software provider’s profit. For 1 1
2 3
c t      , if 
the manufacturer chooses AP, the software provider faces a smaller (relative to DP) 
demand in country A. To see this, let’s compare the inverse demand function for the 
legitimate software in country A for two regimes: 
 1 1
A A B A
A Ao hAP hAP o
oAP oDP
p p p t c p t cq q  
                    
, where AoAPq  and 
A
oDPq  denote the quantity demanded for the legitimate software in country A for 
regime AP and DP, respectively. The same results can be obtained in country B as 
well. When comparing the software provider’s profit in country B for AP and DP, 
because * *B BhAP hDPp p , the demand for legitimate software in country B (i.e. 
1 B Bo hp p  ) decreases in AP relative to DP. In short, the demand for the legitimate 
software decreases in both countries when the hardware firm chooses AP. Therefore, 
the profit of the software provider will decrease if the hardware manufacturer 
accommodates PI. On the other hand, for 1 1
2 3
c t      , if the hardware firm 
chooses AP, unlike the autarky case, where the software firm can behave as a 
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monopolist (see equation 4) in country A, the software firm is pinned down by the 
hardware firm in regime AP. In sum, parallel trade in hardware is harmful for the 
software firm even though PI in software is prohibited.  
 
3. Welfare Analysis 
We will first demonstrate a comparison of consumer surplus with and without 
software piracy. Subsequently, we will discuss the impact of PI on consumer’s 
welfare.  
 
3.1 Consumer’s welfare change with software piracy when hardware PI is 
prohibited 
To compare changes in consumer surplus (CS) due to software piracy, let’s first 
calculate the CS in both countries for the benchmark case. i.e. the consumer welfare 
when piracy and PI are not available.  
 
1
2
3
1 1 1d
3 3 18
A B
NN NNCS CS v v
         (12) 
where the subscript NN denotes “No piracy” and “No PI”. 
If there is illegal software copy in country A, the welfare in country A becomes 
     1
2 1
v 1* * *
v v
1 d dA A A APN hPN hPN oPNCS v p c v v p p v           (13) 
where
     * *
1 2
1
12 2v ,  v ,  ,  
1 2 2
A A
hPN oPN
cc c c c cp p
        
 
               
and the subscript PN denotes “Piracy” and “No PI”. 
Let the consumer’s welfare change in country A be A A APN PN NNCS CS CS   . We 
can verify that the consumer’s surplus will increase by checking figure 7. From the 
25 
 
graph, we see APNCS  is always positive on the same domain of figure 1 suggesting 
that consumers are always better off when software piracy exists. In section 2.2, we 
have explained that both firms might be better off due to piracy in certain 
circumstances. (i.e. the medium dark area in figure 1.) Combining the results in 
section 2.2 and the present section, we can say that software piracy could be Pareto 
improving. Lemma 1 summarizes this finding. 
 
Lemma 1. If hardware parallel importation is not permitted, the existence of software 
piracy can be Pareto improving. 
[Insert Figure 7 here] 
The reason for firms to be better off when piracy exists has been discussed in 
section 2.2 and thus we won’t repeat it here. The intuition for an increase in 
consumer’s welfare is as what follows. Software piracy can lower consumers’ 
threshold of adoption and hence low type consumers can also be served by the 
hardware manufacturer.  
 
3.2 Welfare change due to parallel imports given software piracy 
In this section, we are going to discuss welfare change in both countries due to 
parallel imports. Because the manufacturer has two options to serve country A (DP 
and AP), we will discuss two scenarios respectively. 
 
Scenario 1: Deterring PI (DP) 
Let the consumer’s surplus in country A and B when the manufacturer deters PI 
be 
     1
2 1
v 1* * *
v v
1 d d
DP
DP DP
A A A A
DP hDP hDP oDPCS v p c v v p p v           (14) 
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  * *1 * * d                                               B B
oDP hDP
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DP oDP hDPp p
CS v p p v    (15) 
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       * *3 1 2 4 3 1 2 4,  ,
7 3 7 3
A B
hDP hDP
c t c t
p t p
   
 
            
* * 2 2,  
2 7 3
A B
oDP oDP
c c tp p  
        
The consumer’s welfare change due to PI in country A is now 
A A A
DP DP PNCS CS CS   . We can conclude that if DP is the manufacturer’s best choice, 
consumer’s surplus in country A will increase. If, in equilibrium, the manufacturer 
chooses DP, he needs to cut the hardware price in the PI recipient country. In addition, 
the software provider will not change his pricing behavior because, for the same 
reason stated in section 2.2, 1v  is independent of the hardware price
A
hDPp . In short, 
consumers in country A face a lower hardware price and an unchanged software price, 
and hence, consumer’s welfare increases in country A. 
The consumer’s welfare in country B can be calculated through the change of the 
system price, which is the sum of hardware price and software price, because by the 
assumption that there’s no piracy in country B, consumers in country B purchase the 
hardware and the legitimate software together. The consumer’s surplus in country B 
will decrease because of the increase of hardware price BhDPp . Even though the 
software firm responses to the increase of hardware price by cutting software price, as 
described in footnote 15, the sum of hardware price and software price in country B 
still goes up. In sum, if the hardware manufacturer deters PI, consumers in country A 
will benefit whereas consumers in country B will be worse off.  
The software provider won’t be affected in country A but will suffer in country B 
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as we analyzed in section 2.3.1. Thus, if the hardware manufacturer chooses DP, the 
software provider will be worse off. 
 
Scenario 2: Accommodating PI (AP) 
If the hardware manufacturer chooses to accommodate PI, the consumer’s 
surplus in country A and B will be 
     1
2 1
v 1* * *
v v
1 d d
AP
AP AP
A B A A
AP hAP hAP oAPCS v p t c v v p p v            (16) 
  * *1 * * d                                                 B B
hAP oAP
B B B
AP hAP oAPp p
CS v p p v    (17) 
Because AP is feasible for both 1 1
2 3
c t       and 1 1
2 3
c t      , yet 
two cases have different equilibrium conditions, to explain the impact of AP on 
consumer welfare, we need to discuss two cases separately: 
 
Case 1: 1 1
2 3
c t       
 
In this case, the hardware firm has two options: DP and AP. AP is optimal for the 
hardware firm if * *hAP hDP  . Therefore, to discuss how consumer’s surplus changes 
when the hardware firm chooses accommodating PI, * *hAP hDP   is a preliminary 
condition. Figure 8 (figure 9) shows the region where consumers in country A benefit 
(suffer) from PI if the hardware firm chooses AP. We can see that both sets are 
nonempty. They indicate that the impact of AP on consumer’s welfare in country A is 
ambiguous. Applying the same technique to the analysis of consumer’s welfare 
change in country B, we find that the region for consumers in country B to be better 
off is empty suggesting that consumer’s surplus decreases in country B. 
[Insert Figure 8 here] 
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[Insert Figure 9 here] 
 
Case 2: 1 1
2 3
c t       
 
In this case, the hardware manufacturer will choose either autarky pricing or AP. If 
the hardware firm chooses AP, consumers in country A are worse due to PI. Figure 10 
shows the region where consumers in country A suffer from AP. We do not provide 
the region where consumers in country A benefit from AP because it is an empty set. 
[Insert Figure 10 here] 
The welfare change of consumers in country B is ambiguous in this case. Figure 
11 (figure 12) depicts the region where consumers in country B benefit (suffer) from 
AP.  
[Insert Figure 11 here] 
[Insert Figure 12 here] 
Table 3 summarizes welfare change due to software piracy and table 4 
summarizes welfare change due to parallel imports. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
In this section, we demonstrate welfare implication of PI. It should be noted that 
unlike piracy which creates extra demand for hardware, the way for the hardware 
manufacturer to benefit from PI is to extract profits from the software firm. The 
intuition of firm’s profit change has been discussed in previous sections and thus we 
won’t repeat it here. Consumer’s welfare implication is also intuitive. Firstly, DP 
lowers the hardware price in country A suggesting that the consumers in country A are 
better off; however, consumers in the parallel exporting country will be worse off due 
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to price convergence between two countries as stated in Malueg and Schwartz (1994).  
Secondly, the impact of AP on consumer’s welfare depends on the autarky price of 
the hardware. As stated in most economic textbooks, cēterīs paribus, price 
discrimination is harmful for consumers. When the closed-economy hardware price in 
country A is high, allowing PI is generally beneficial for consumers in country A; 
however, the benefits could be eroded if the hardware firm chooses to utilize PI as the 
channel to achieving price discrimination. Therefore, when the autarky hardware price 
in country A is high, the impact of AP on consumer’s welfare in country A is 
ambiguous. On the other hand, when the autarky hardware price in country A is low, 
consumers in country A can’t obtain any benefits from an open policy but need to bear 
the welfare loss due to price discrimination. Hence, consumers in country A are worse 
off in the case of AP when the autarky hardware price in country A is low.  
The analysis of consumer’s welfare change in country B in the case of AP is 
provided below. For 1 1
2 3
c t      , we have argued that consumers in country 
B are worse off if the hardware firm chooses DP. In addition, because 
 
 
 
 
2 2
2 2
2 2 2
2 7 3 2 7 3
B B
AP DP
c t c t
CS CS
 
 
         , consumers in country B must be 
worse off due to AP. The intuition behind this result is that when 1 1
2 3
c t      , 
modified hardware is more attractive, and thus the hardware firm can serve country A 
by high price PI. As a consequence, the hardware price in the PI exporting country 
raises and thus consumers in country B are worse off. On the other hand, for 
1 1
2 3
c t      , it should be noted that in this case, parallel trade will occur only 
in the form of AP. Intuitively, To make PI possible, the hardware manufacturer may 
need to reduce the price in country B to attract low type consumers in country A. 
Therefore, if the autarky hardware price in country A is low, it is still possible for 
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consumers in country B to be better off due to AP.  
 
4. Region-free Hardware 
If the hardware is region-free, the PI recipient country could be country A or country 
B. Suppose that country A is the PI recipient country, the claim that all consumers 
who purchase PI hardware will pirate the software still holds. The reason is as follows. 
Because the hardware manufacturer does not provide after-sale service to a PI buyer, 
an official software consumer who purchases PI hardware has a surplus of 
 1 B Ah ov p t p    , which is smaller than  1 Bhv p t c       given the fact 
that 0 Aoc p   . Therefore, if country A is the PI recipient country, the result 
won’t change even though the hardware is region-free. 
However, is it possible for country B to be the PI recipient country when the 
hardware is region-free? The following analysis shows that country B can’t be the PI 
recipient country. First, we will claim that serving country B only by authorized 
products (deterring PI) is not feasible by adopting proof by contradiction. Suppose 
that country B is the PI recipient country. Let 1v
B  be the valuation of the marginal 
consumer who is indifferent between authorized hardware and PI in country B. 1v
B  
must satisfy    1 1v 1 vB B B B A Bh o h op p p t p       and is equal to  1 B Ah hp p t   . 
Similarly, let 2v
B  be the valuation of the marginal consumer who is indifferent 
between PI and no adoption. We have  2 1v 1B A Bh op t p   . Because 1 2v vB B , 
we have    1 11B A A Bh h h op p t p t p      . Solving this inequality implies 
   B A B Bh h h op p t p p    . However, deterring PI implies that B Ah hp p t  , which 
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is a contradiction to     0B A B Bh h h op p t p p     given positive prices 
assumptions.  
We have shown that B Ah hp p t   does not hold, but on the other hand, in 
equilibrium, can we have B Ah hp p t  , which is the case that the hardware 
manufacturer serves country B by both authorized products and PI simultaneously? 
The work in the appendix A3 proves that this is still infeasible for the hardware 
manufacturer. In summary, even though the hardware is region free, it is still a 
one-way PI outcome from country B to country A. This result can explain why Sony 
makes its new game console region-free. As stated above, embedding a region code 
on the hardware is redundant because the region code does not play any role. Parallel 
trade occurs from country B to country A no matter whether there is region code or 
not.  
 
5. Discussion and Conclusions 
This article analyzes the impact of outlaw innovations on the video game market. We 
obtain three results that are different from general expectation. Firstly, we discuss the 
existence of software piracy in a closed economy. Our benchmark model indicates 
that the hardware manufacturer may benefit from piracy as expected by most people. 
However, we also find that software piracy may also be beneficial to the software 
provider. Secondly, we extend our closed-economy analysis to a two-country model 
where the modification chips are available in one country but are unavailable in the 
other. We show that the existence of hardware parallel imports is beneficial to the 
hardware manufacturer but is harmful to the software provider. Thirdly, our welfare 
analysis shows that the consumers in the PI recipient country are not necessarily 
better off. If the hardware manufacturer deters PI, consumers in the PI recipient 
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country will benefit as expected. However, if the hardware provider chooses to serve 
the country by both authorized products and parallel imports, PI provide the 
manufacturer a key to second-degree price discriminating the consumers in the PI 
recipient country. In this case, consumers in the PI recipient country may be worse 
off.  
This article considers a non-cooperative game; however, some may argue that it is 
possible for both software and hardware firms to cooperate and offer a bundle of 
hardware and software to prevent piracy. In appendix A4, it is shown that there does 
not exist a way to distribute the joint profit such that both firms are willing to join the 
coalition. Consequently, bundling won’t be utilized to prevent piracy. 
It should be noted that the results of this article base on the assumption that both 
the hardware manufacturer and the software provider are monopoly. If there are two 
or more firms who produce homogeneous products in the market, price competition 
leads to zero profits. If firms are differentiated vertically, it will be difficult to set up 
consumers’ preference order. For example, if authorized product i is superior to 
authorized product j, then whether PI of ith product are inferior to jth authorized 
products or not is crucial for the analysis. Unfortunately, we do not have a judgment 
on preference order. As the number of firms increases, it becomes too complicated to 
analyze. Therefore, we assume one hardware manufacturer and one software provider 
in the model. Although this assumption is somewhat strong, it is still acceptable 
because in the realistic world, different brands of game consoles or software are 
reasonably differentiated in several dimensions, and thus firms have market power 
even though the inverse demand will become flatter due to competition. Hence, our 
analysis may still work for explaining the change in region-code strategy adopted by 
the hardware manufacturer. 
The result of the model suggests that piracy is welfare improving for consumers. 
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However, this result could only be true in a static model. In the present analysis, we 
show that piracy could sometimes be beneficial for the software provider; however, it 
is more common to see that the software firm suffers from piracy. In a dynamic model, 
even though consumers can be better off due to software piracy in the short run, 
piracy would be harmful for the software firm’s investment incentive in quality 
improvement or development of new software. As a consequence, with software 
piracy, the consumer’s welfare would decrease in the long run. 
As aforementioned, we adopt horizontal retail price arbitrage framework in the 
analysis. Parallel to the case of accommodating PI, applying this idea to vertical price 
control framework, we expect that the manufacturer will charge a higher wholesale 
price in country A and a lower wholesale price in country B to encourage PI and get 
benefits from price discrimination. Although we do not provide vertical price control 
model in the present article, it will be interesting for future analysis. In addition, in 
this model, the utility discount factor  1   is assumed to be exogenous. Because 
  can be interpreted as the probability that a consumer needs after-sale service for 
the hardware, for future research, it would be interesting to endogenize this parameter.   
The article aims to provide some policy implications regarding IPR exhaustion 
policy in the video game market. In contrast to general expectation that consumers are 
better off in the presence of PI, it is shown in this article that the impact of PI on 
consumer’s welfare in the PI-recipient country is ambiguous if the parallel imported 
product is complementary to other goods. An open policy in parallel importation is 
not necessarily good for consumers in the video game market or analogous industries 
that feature complementarity.  
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Appendix 
A1. The derivation of c   
   
1
12v
2 2
A
oPN
c cp c c
   
  
          and  
 2
1
12v
1 1 2 2 1
A
hPN
c cp c c
   
  
            .  
Because 1 2v v , we have  
1 1
2 2 2 2 1
c c 
 
     . This inequality is equivalent to 
    
 
1
0
2 1
c c   
 
     . Given  0,1  , the inequality can be reduced to 
    1 0c c        , which is the inequality c  . 
 
 
A2. The derivation of (10) 
 1
0
A A
h o
A B
h
v p p
U v p t c 
       
 ; 
0
B B
B h ov p pU
   
 
For simplicity, we ignore the subscript AP. A consumer with valuation 1v  in country 
A is indifferent between legitimate software and illegal software if 
 1 1v 1 vA A Bh o hp p p t c         . Solving for 1v , we can say that consumers 
with 1v
A A B
o h hp p p t cv 
       will purchase the authorized hardware and 
official software. Similarly, A consumer with valuation 2v  in country A will be 
indifferent between illegal software and no adoption if  1 0Bhv p t c       . 
Thus, 2v 1
B
hp t c 

    . Consumers with valuation between 2v  and 1v will 
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purchase the PI hardware. The quantity demanded for the authorized hardware in 
country A can be calculated by 
 
1
1
v
1d 1
A A B
o h hp p p t cx 
      , 
whereas the quantity demanded for the PI hardware is 
 1
2
v
v
1d
1
A A B B
o h h hp p p t c p t cx   
          . 
Therefore, the profit of the hardware manufacturer is the sum of profit from 
authorized channels in both countries and the profit from PI. The profit from 
authorized channel in country B is shown in the benchmark, which is equal to 
 1B B Bh o hp p p  .  
The profit from authorized channel in country A is 1
A A B
A o h h
h
p p p t cp 
       
.  
The profit generated from PI is 
1
A A B B
B o h h h
h
p p p t c p t cp   
          
. 
Summing these terms up leads to (10). 
 
A3. Country B won’t be the PI recipient country 
Suppose that country B is the PI recipient country. The quantity demanded for the 
authorized hardware is 
1
1
v
1d 1
B
B A
h hp p tx 
   . Similarly, the quantity demanded for 
the PI hardware can be represented by 1
2
v
v
1d
1
B
B
B A A B
h h h op p t p t px  
      . Because 
all buyers in country B purchase legitimate software, the quantity demanded for the 
software is 
2
1
v
1d 1
1B
A B
h op t px 
    . 
The hardware manufacturer faces the following profit maximization problem: 
 ,max 1 11 1A Bh h
B A B A A B A
B A Ah h h h h o h
hRF h h h
p p
p p t p p t p t p p cp p p     
                            
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where RF indicates region free. The first term is the profit from selling authorized 
products in country B. The second term is the profit from PI while the third term is the 
profit of authorized products in country A. The software provider’s profit 
maximization problem is now 
  ,max 1 11A Bo o
A B A
B Ah o o
oRF o o
p p
p t p p cp p   
               
 
The first (second) term is the profit from country B (country A). 
Solving the optimization problem of both firms with respect to Ahp , 
B
hp , 
A
op , and 
B
op  , we have 
 
   * *
* *
3 3 2 6 4 5
,  ,  
7 14
2 2 3,  
2 7
A B
h h
A B
o o
c t c t
p p
c c tp p
   
   
        
      
 
Substituting *Ahp , 
*B
hp , 
*A
op , and 
*B
op   into 1v
B  and 2v
B  and imposing the 
assumption that 1 2v v
B B , we have  
 
   
 
* *
1
* *
2
6 4 5 3 3 2
14 7
v
3 3 2 2 2 3
7 7v
1 1
B A
B h h
A B
B h o
c t c t
t
p p t
c t c ttp t p
   
 
   
 
               
           
 
Given  0,1   and 0t  , solving the above inequality yields 
    3 1 7 0
2
t
c
   
     . 
 This contradicts to the result that 0c   , which has been proven in A1. 
 
A4. Bundling won’t be utilized to prevent piracy 
When both firms cooperate and offer a bundle of hardware and software, the 
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equilibrium price of the bundle can be derived by solving the following profit 
maximization problem: 
    max 1BUp p p p    
The equilibrium price of the bundle is 1/2 and joint profit is 1/4. Let  0,1s  be the 
fraction of the joint profit that goes to the hardware manufacturer. When piracy exists, 
the hardware manufacturer would prefer to cooperate with the software firm if 
 
 
21
4 1 4
c s 

    . Similarly, the software firm would prefer to offer a bundle by 
cooperating with the hardware firm if  2 1
4 4
c s 

   . Given   and  c  , if 
we can find an s  such that both inequalities hold, then cooperation can be the 
equilibrium. In other words, by definition of the core of a coalition game, the core is 
nonempty if   
21
4 1 4
c s 

    and 
 2 1
4 4
c s 

    simultaneously hold. 
Accordingly, the core is nonempty if    2 21 1
1
c c
s
   
 
       . However, 
this double inequality never holds because 
       
2 2 21
1 0
1 1
c c c    
   
            for  0,1  ,  
which is a contradiction to the condition for the core to exist. In other words, with 
aforementioned restrictions on parameters, we have  
     
 2 21 1, , |
4 1 4 4 4
c cs sc s
      
                             
 
It suggests that there is no way to find a method to distribute the joint profit such that 
both firms agree to join the coalition. Hence, bundling won’t be adopted to prevent 
piracy.  
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Figures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The probability that the hardware  
needs after-sale service 
The difference betw
een extra benefit of 
m
odification and fixed cost 
The dark area indicates 
that the software firm 
benefits from piracy. 
The light area indicates that 
the hardware firm benefits 
from piracy 
The medium dark area 
indicates that both firms 
benefit from piracy. 
Figure 1: The area where the firms can benefit from piracy 
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Figure 2 The region where the hardware firm can benefit 
from DP 
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needs after-sale service 
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Figure 3 The region where the hardware manufacturer 
suffers from DP (Empty Set) 
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Figure 4 The region where AP dominates DP 
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extra benefit of modification 
Figure 5 The region where AP dominates Autarky 
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Figure 6 Conditions for different equilibrium strategies 
Note: 
Condition 1:  2 2 2 1 ( 3) 0c               
Condition 2:  1 2 1 3c t       
Condition 3: hAP hDP   
Condition 4:      21 9 1 4 1hAP c          
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extra benefit of modification 
Figure 7 Consumer’s welfare change is positive 
when software piracy is present. 
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International 
shipping cost 
The probability that the hardware  
needs after-sale service 
Figure 8 The region where consumers in country A are better off 
if the manufacturer chooses AP for 1 1
2 3
c
t
       
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International 
shipping cost 
The probability that the hardware 
needs after-sale service 
The difference between  
fixed cost and extra benefit of 
modification 
Figure 9 The region where consumers in country A are worse off 
due to PI if the manufacturer chooses AP for 1 1
2 3
c
t
       
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The probability that the hardware  
needs after-sale service 
International 
shipping cost 
The difference between fixed cost and 
extra benefit of modification 
Figure 10 The region where consumers in country A suffer from AP 
for 1 1
2 3
c
t
        
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The probability that the hardware 
needs after-sale service 
International 
shipping cost 
The difference between fixed cost and 
extra benefit of modification 
Figure 11 The region where consumers in country B benefit from AP 
for 1 1
2 3
c
t
       
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The probability that the hardware 
needs after-sale service 
International 
shipping cost 
The difference between fixed cost and 
extra benefit of modification 
Figure 12 The region where consumers in country B suffer from AP 
for 1 1
2 3
c
t
       
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Tables 
 
Table 1 Payoff matrix of two firms 
  O 
 Strategy Deter Piracy Accommodate Piracy 
H 
Deter 
Piracy 
1 1,
9 9
 
2(2 )
16
c    , 
(2 )( )
8
c c       
Accommodate 
Piracy 
2(1 )
4(1 )
c 

  
 , 
( 1 3( ))(1 )
16
c c   

      
 
 
21
4 1
c 

  
 , 
 2
4
c 

 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 The strategies that are available for the manufacturer to adopt 
 Strategy 
Condition Closed economy Deter PI Accommodate PI 
1 1
2 3
c
t
       No Yes Yes 
1 1
2 3
c
t
       Yes No Yes 
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Table 3 Welfare Change Due to Piracy 
 
Piracy in country A 
(Closed Economy) 
Hardware Firm +/- 
Software Firm +/- 
Consumer in A + 
Consumer in B unchanged 
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Table 4  Welfare Change Due to PI 
Deter PI Accommodate PI 
1 1
2 3
c
t
       
Hardware Firm + + 
Software Firm - - 
Consumer in A + +/- 
Consumer in B - - 
1 1
2 3
c
t
       
Hardware Firm N/A + 
Software Firm N/A - 
Consumer in A N/A - 
Consumer in B N/A +/- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
